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Ronald Perrin

The works of the philosopher Herbert Marcuse form the basis for
this inquiry into the possibility of human happiness. The thesis
explores the social, psychological and philosophical basis for
the establishment of a general happiness. It also seeks to clar
ify the inherent obstacles and limitations to such a condition.
Beginning with an examination of the hedonistic and eudaemonistic
traditions, the study explores the underlying relationship be
tween the exercise of reason and the premise of happiness.
The necessary connection between reason, happiness and social
justice in Plato's philosophy was reflected in the development of
Marcuse's critical theory of society. It was the Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts of Karl Marx, however, which provided
him with a radically new understanding of the essence of man and
the proper use of reason. He made use of Marx's dialectical ma
terialism to analyze the objective changes in social organization
necessary for the realization of a general human happiness.
In the 1930's, Marcuse believed that the prospects for the free
satisfaction of human needs were at hand. The rise of fascism and
the Holocaust, however, shattered any faith he might have had in
the inevitability of proletarian revolution. In the 1940's, he
turned his attention to the works of Sigmund Freud in an attenpt
to understand the irrational farces within the human psyche which
had permitted the rise of fascism.
In Eros and Civilization and subsequent works, Marcuse argued
that under the ideal conditions of mature industrial society, hu
man agressiveness could be replaced by an aesthetic ethos which
placed the pursuit of happiness above competitive economic pur
suits. This study explores the principal themes of his critical
theory, with an emphasis on the relationship between his concep
tion of instinctual liberation and the possibility of happiness.
Marcuse also explored the power of authentic works of art to
instill in individuals a vital need for radical change. In the
end, however, he held that death represents an ultimate obstacle
to the goal of lasting happiness. In the final chapter of the
thesis, the relationship between time and happiness is examined
in light of the tendencies within society which may increase the
possibility for greater human happiness. While Marcuse's critical
theory has not resolved the problem of unhappiness, it does rep
resent the ongoing cannitment of philosophy to human welfare.
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THE CRITICAL THEORY OF HERBERT MARCUSE:
AN INQUIRY INTO THE POSSIBILITY OF HUMAN HAPPINESS

INTRODUCTION

The question of human happiness has been of enduring interest to
philosophers since the time of Plato and Aristotle. In our time, the
philosopher Herbert Marcuse made the inquiry into the possibility of
happiness a cornerstone of his critical theory of society. This thesis
will explore Marcuse's treatment of the question of human happiness as
it relates to his overall social theory.
Marcuse's interest in the problem of social unhappiness led him to
re-examine the works of previous thinkers on this subject. Aristotle,
for example, maintained that happiness represented the proper final end
far mankind. Hedonist and utilitarian philosophers argued that happi
ness, measured by the ratio of pleasure to pain, constituted the only
thing good in itself. Christian philosophy of the Middle Ages and the
moral philosophy of the bourgeois period, while emphasizing duty, also
produced a promise of happiness. According to Marcuse, however, it was
a false premise which could not cure the discord within society.
While the goal of happiness has represented a perennial concern,
understanding of the nature of happiness has varied significantly.
For Plato and Aristotle, the term eudaemonia characterized happiness in
the sense that one possessed those things worth having and engaged in
activities which were morally virtuous. Because they believed that the
capacity to reason represented mankind's unique and highest endowment,
and because goodness and virtue could not be understood without the use
1
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of reason, they maintained that happiness could be attained only
through the use of reason. The irrationality of sensual satisfactions
marked them as dubious contributors to eudaemonia. This definition
stands in sharp contrast with one version of hedonism which defined
happiness as the satisfaction of whatever desires an individual might
possess.
Marcuse's critical theory ccmbined features of eudaemonism with
the hedonistic protest against the repression of sensuality. He argued
that some needs are better satisfied than others and that individual
happiness cannot be separated from the creation of a rational society.
His criticism of hedonism was based on the conviction that purely
subjective gratification in the face of general misery is incompatible
with the need to abolish that misery.
In defense of hedonism, Marcuse maintained that in the hedonistic
protest against the repression of sensuality is preserved the possi
bility of a general happiness. According to his theory, human happi
ness requires both the gratification of instinctual inpulses and the
exercise of reason.
Whether one subscribes to a eudaemonistic or to a hedonistic
conception of happiness, any characterization of happiness must entail
the satisfaction of some human need or desire. The repression of human
needs would, therefore, tend to give rise to a state of unhappiness.
Marcuse's first exposition on the subject of happiness was con
tained in an essay entitled "On Hedonism" which was published in
1938.1 in it, he examined the problematic of happiness and provided
a critique of what he termed 'the philosophy of reason.'
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For Marcuse, the organization of Western civilization has been
shaped by the political, economic, moral and scientific theories made
possible by a philosophy of reason. This philosophy originated in
Plato and Aristotle's preoccupation with reason as man's essential
nature. Because they equated the highest good exclusively with the
exercise of reason, they came to regard the pursuit of sensual grat
ification as something evil. Both philosophers branded as irrational
the appetitive and instinctual elements of the human constitution.
According to Marcuse, the conflict between reason and sensuality
expressed in the works of Plato and Aristotle greatly contributed to
the development of repressive morality and hierarchical social or
ganization. It also served to justify a capitalist mode of economic
organization which made efficient operation more important than human
happiness.
Marcuse linked the philosophy of reason to "the development of the
productive forces, the free rational shaping of the conditions of
life, the domination of nature, and the critical autonomy of the
associated individuals.... The idea of reason aims at universality, at
a society in which the antagonistic interests of 'empirical'
individuals are cancelled. "2
In contrast to the philosophy of reason, Marcuse argued that
hedonism "has stressed the comprehensive unfolding and fulfillment of
/

individual wants and needs, emancipation from an inhuman labor
process, and liberation of the world for the purposes of enjoy
ment.... Hedonism wants to preserve the development and gratification
of the individual as a goal within an anarchic and impoverished
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reality."^
Marcuse's critique of the philosophy of reason represents a key
element of his critical theory and his consideration of the question
of human happiness. By linking the philosophy of reason to the devel
opment of the productive forces and the domination of nature, Marcuse
was able to extend his critique to technology and what he termed
'technological rationality'. It was not technology, per se, which was
objectionable, but its utilization as a means of social domination.
Like the philosophy of reason, technological rationality represented
for Marcuse more of an attitude than a method. He argued that the
deamination of nature, which technological rationality encouraged, also
fosters the deamination of man. According to Marcuse, social domination
has resulted in social unhappiness which can be alleviated only by a
fundamental change in society itself.
Marcuse also saw the philosophy of reason at work in bourgeois
morality, especially in Kant's moral philosophy. He criticized bour
geois morality for its rejection of. individual happiness in favor of
duty to universal laws which are indifferent to individual fate. In
his analysis, since happiness can never be guaranteed in a contingent
world, bourgeois morality placed the promise of happiness outside of
society. He asserted that the possibility of happiness was preserved
only in bourgeois art.
Marcuse's critical theory was significantly influenced by his
reading of Marx, especially by such early works as the Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts. Marx's analysis provided Marcuse with a
conception of human nature which helped him to better grasp the
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question of happiness. Marx's materialist philosophy emphasized labor
as the universal human activity. His theory of history provided a
critique of the class nature of society, and he called for a revolu
tion of the working class, or proletariat, as the means by which
social domination could be eradicated.
Marx's analysis pointed to a division of labor which impoverishes
the laborer, while denying to him any control over his work activity,
as an objective basis for social unhappiness. His analysis of capi
talism also provided a theory of social revolution which promised
greater freedom and happiness by eliminating the capitalist division
of labor. The Marxian conception of labor as man's essential nature
represented for Marcuse a key element of any social theory which
proposes not only to understand human nature, but to also influence
the course of human events.
Marx's materialist philosophy represented for Marcuse an advance
over the idealist philosophy of reason to the extent that it based its
analysis on the real conditions under which men and women live. His
critique of capitalism was also a call to action to the victims of
capitalism. While bourgeois morality offered the promise of happiness
in the life hereafter, Marxist theory envisioned human happiness with
in a rational social order. It was not until after the proletarian
revolution, predicted by Marx, failed to materialize in Western Europe
that Marcuse turned his attention to other ideas.
As the revolutionary movements of the 1920's were shattered,
Marcuse observed that "the end of a historical period and the horror
of the one to came were announced in the simultaneity of the civil war
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in Spain and the trials in Moscow. "4 The rise of Nazism and the
Holocaust led Marcuse to conclude that irrational forces within the
human psyche oould lead to behavior clearly at odds with human selfinterest. His search far an explanation for the support offered to
Hitler by the German working class led him to the works of Freud.
Of particular interest to Marcuse were Freud's metapsychological
speculations after 1920. Freud's theory of human instinctive behavior
postulated the existence of both life and death instincts within the
human psyche. The presence of death instincts represented, for Freud,
a significant problem in that those instincts must be permanently
repressed if civilization is to avoid chaos and barbarism. The theory
of instincts was adopted by Marcuse despite the pessimistic implica
tions it produced in Freud's work. In contrast to Freud, Marcuse re
cast Thanatos, or the death instinct, not as the urge to death, but
toward the elimination of pain. Consequently, as pain and misery were
reduced, death "would cease to be an instinctual goal. "5
While Freud viewed the destructive instincts as largely immutable
and forever in need of repression, Marcuse maintained that objective
changes in social organization oould reduce the aggressive tendencies
within the psyche and allow for a much greater measure of freedom and
happiness. Thus, his critical theory of society developed in response
to the challenges posed both by Marx and by Freud. His theory sought
to reconcile the need for rational organization with the irrational
demands of the human instinctual constitution.
The publication in 1955 of Marcuse's Eros and Civilization
repressited one of the first efforts to reconcile the works of Marx
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and Freud. In it, he utilized his critical theory to demonstrate the
objective possibilities for a non-repressive society. He argued for a
'rational sensuality' which oould satisfy basic material needs through
a rational distribution of the goods of society while also satisfying
instinctual needs for peace and pleasure through the creation of an
aesthetic sensibility.
Marcuse's study of the human psyche in Eros and Civilization led
him to the conclusion that only the imagination remained free from the
farces which dominate society. The failure of the proletarian revolu
tion confirmed for him the power of such repressive institutions as
the church, the state and the multinational corporation. These in
stitutions have propped up an order of scarcity and inequality at a
time when the productive capacity of society could provide for the
basic needs of all of its citizens. They have also created a permanent
war economy which threatens the very survival of the human species.
Because Marx's proletariat has dissolved as a revolutionary force,
Marcuse turned his attention to the imagination in order to project a
new historical subject for which revolution might constitute a vital
need.
This theme was pursued in works such as An Essay on Liberation and
Counter-Revolution and Revolt where Marcuse argued forcefully for a
'new sensibility' which would place human happiness before competitive
economic pursuits as the goal of social organization. He believed that
the images of freedom and gratification preserved by the imagination
oould be expressed in works of art. His subsequent turn to art repre
sented an attenpt to indict existing reality in favor of its repress
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ed, but genuinely human possibilities.
In his final work, The Aesthethic Dimension, Marcuse maintained
that art "is caimitted to an emancipation of sensibility, imagina
tion, and reason in all spheres of subjectivity and objectivity. "6
For Marcuse, aesthethic form came to replace Marx's proletariat as the
determinate negation of existing society. Its coirmitment to beauty
stands in sharp contrast to the present ugliness of post-industrial
society and because of its coirmitment to beauty it plays a critical
role in any atteirpt to reform society.
Marcuse's argument that aesthetic form had cane to replace the
proletariat is significant because it represents the first socialist
theory of revolution which lacked a revolutionary class. Many on the
left have criticized Marcuse's turn to art as an abandonment of
revolutionary praxis because he maintained that the individuals to
which authentic art might appeal are socially anonymous.
What Marcuse's critics must bear in mind is the fact that he
openly acknowledged the limitations of his critical theory. Marcuse
noted that the coirmitment of art to beauty weakens the negation con
tained in the art work. Enjoyment derived from great works of art
provides a catharsis which cancels the indictment delivered by the
work. In the aid, he argued that works of art are powerless to change
the world.
In his last work, The Aesthetic Dimension, Marcuse also insisted
that no society could transcend what is called chance or fate and that
irresolvable contradictions and sorrow are inevitable. One reason for
this conclusion is the fact of death which "denies once and for all
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the reality of a non-repressive existence.
While this conclusion raises questions about the direction of
Marcuse's critical theory, it does not remove happiness as the object
of a rational society. The tragic features of existence have long been
recognized in philosophy and Marcuse's pessimistic conclusions must be
carefully weighed in relation to the necessary task of ongoing social
reconstruction.
The impulse to reform society is perennial and derives from
certain uncritical judgments about the human condition. Every
philosophical system rests on certain fundamental presuppositions
which are not susceptible to logical demonstration. In Marcuse1s
social philosophy, the claim that a general happiness ought to be
realized in society serves as such a presupposition. Unless one
accepts such a claim as true then it is impossible to argue that
individuals ought to act in such a way as to attain happiness. For
Marcuse, the validity of the claim that happiness should be attained
enjoyed the same status as the claim that life is valuable or that
life is preferable to death.
Marcuse's critical theory relies heavily upon judgments of a
non-enpirical nature. For example, he held that the ontological
distinction between essence and appearance also involves an ethical
distinction between "is" and "ought". Truth cannot be described simply
as what is, but more correctly as what ought to be. His critical
theory relies upon the claim that truth is not described by the facts
of social existence, but rather by their unrealized possibilities.
Given this emphasis on possibility, Marcuse's reliance on the imagin
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ation as the faculty which sees behind and beyond the facts of social
existence is understandable.
Marcuse made use of his conception of truth as a means to better
comprehend the possibilities for human happiness. He maintained that
happiness requires knowledge of the truth. However, since knowledge of
the present state of society is hardly conducive to happiness, he
believed that we are confronted with a dileitma. Happiness requires
knowledge, but knowledge leads to unhappiness. The way out of the
dilemna, according to Marcuse, would ccsne from the creation of a
rational society based on knowledge of the truth.
It is at this point that Marcuse's theory is most subject to
criticism. If truth is described not by the facts, but by unrealized
possibilities, then which possibilities should be counted as true?
Marcuse did argue for a number of values which he believed should be
incorporated into social existence. It is very problematic, however,
to maintain that such a list of values will ever be universally ac
cepted as true in any objective sense. While it is possible to accept
his contention that human possibilities are never restricted to the
facts of social existence, it will prove far more difficult to argue
successfully for any particular set of values as higher or more true
than another.
Marcuse's use of idealist conceptions must also be carefully
scrutinized in order to avoid reliance on purely subjective judgments.
When utilized as the normative basis for an objective analysis of
social conditions, such judgments may lead to conclusions which not
only are at odds with the facts, but which may be incompatible with
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the possibilities.
One idealist conception utilized by Marcuse was that of essence.
His designation of happiness as an appropriate social goal rests upon
the answer to another question: What is man? The question of whether
or not mankind possesses sane unique and essential nature is as old as
philosophy. As we have seen, Plato and Aristotle held that because
only man possesses the capacity to reason, this characteristic repre
sents our essence. Since they also believed that happiness requires
the unimpeded use of human faculties, the highest good requires the
use of reason in an act of conteirplation. Other philosophers, in var
ious ways, have made a similar case for reason as humanity's essential
attribute.
The argument for a concept of a uniquely human essence is a com
plex one which goes to the heart of the problem of happiness. While a
concept of essence holds great potential to indict the actual world in
light of its better possibilities, the argument for reason as man's
essential nature is fraught with difficulties. By elevating reason to
the status of the highest good, Aristotle and others, at the same
time, have devalued sensuality and the imagination. According to
Marcuse, the subsequent repression of sensuality in the name of reason
is a major cause of unhappiness.
The argument for a particular human essence can also be understood
as an argument in favor of the exercise of one human faculty over
another. If it is true that happiness results from the proper inte
gration of all human faculties and capacities, then the argument for
any distinctive human essence becomes part of the problem rather than

12

part of the solution to the question of happiness. It was, in fact,
Marcuse's contention that reason and sensuality must be harmonized
before happiness can be attained.
The problem of happiness is further compounded by the issue of
false needs. Marcuse, following the eudaemonistic tradition init
iated by Plato, maintained that it was possible to distinguish between
'higher' and 'lower' and between 'true' and 'false' needs. He argued
that a 'technological veil' blinded individuals from knowing what
their true interests were and that it may be necessary to disrupt
their choices in the interest of genuine freedom.
The issue of whether or not true human needs can be distinguished
from false ones will occupy little attention in this study. With the
exception of needs which are clearly destructive to the individual or
to others, it is difficult to maintain that the gratification of the
need to read poetry, for example, is inherently higher or lower than
the need to engage in physical exercise. Although Marcuse argued for
aesthetic consciousness as a higher need which is currently repressed
by consumer society, the rational society projected by his critical
theory would not restrict the free gratification of human needs, ex
cept to the extent required to maintain social order.
Rather than arguing about what might constitute a higher need,
this thesis will only seek to examine what objectively might be
necessary to bring about greater human happiness. It will also exam
ine the inherent limitations to social freedom and happiness which
cast doubt on the efficacy of the entire project.
The goal of a truly rational society remains an unfinished pro-
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ject which may be unattainable. If freedom is a necessary condition
for happiness, however, any attenpt to expand the realm of freedom
would be significant. The alternative view, that individual happiness
is compatible with social unfreedom, holds that inner peace and sat
isfaction can be maintained alongside poverty, injustice and misery.
According to Marcuse, by restricting freedom to the inner autonomy of
the individual, bourgeois morality has determined that general
happiness and a rational society are unattainable.
It should be understood that Marcuse never sought to describe an
ideal society such as More's Utopia. He did describe the preconditions
far a rational society; at the same time he acknowledged the necessity
of social taboos and restraints. Marcuse understood freedom both as
freedom from fear, anxiety and want and as freedom for the fullest
development of human capabilities and sensibilities. The rational
society projected by his critical theory would provide the greatest
opportunity for the free development of human capabilities consistent
with the need to maintain social order.
This thesis will examine the nature of happiness in both its
subjective and objective manifestations. It will then explore the
relationship between happiness and social justice as it develops in
Marcuse's critical theory. Subsequent chapters will discuss Freud's
theory of instinctive behavior, instinctual liberation and the
aesthethic dimension. Finally, the relationship between time and
happiness will be examined. This final chapter will conclude with ah
analysis of the application of Marcuse's critical theory in light of
the obstacles and opportunities for progressive social change.

THE NATURE OF HAPPINESS

The concept of happiness is difficult to grasp. While it is coirmon
to hear people speak of being happy or sad, there is little agreement
as to what the nature of happiness might be. According to Marcuse,
"Happiness is not in the mere feeling of satisfaction but in the
reality of freedom and satisfaction. Happiness involves knowledge: it
is the prerogative of the animal rationale."1
In what sense does happiness involve knowledge? Surely, many of
our happiest moments do not seem to be directly connected to rational
activity. It often appears that the happiest among us are the most
carefree, while those who are aware of the world's problems are the
unhappiest. Because happiness is experienced subjectively as a sense
of well-being, it has received more attention from the proponents of
conformist psychology than from the advocates of progressive social
change. However, if the goal of a rational society is greater human
happiness, then it would seem crucial that political theorists study
its nature.
Marcuse's conception of human happiness drew its inspiration from
both the eudaemonistic and the hedonistic traditions. His eudaemonism
held that certain activities were higher or more likely sources of
happiness than others. His hedonism sought to preserve the world as an
object of pleasure.
What is the nature of happiness? Happiness is commonly expressed
as a sense of well-being. It has also been described as a state in
14
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which an individual has everything that he or she wants or, in the
alternative, as a state in which there is nothing that the individual
wants changed.
The tern 'want' is important in any discussion of the nature of
happiness. For all human beings have wants. Individual happiness is
directly related to an individual's ability to satify his or her
wants. Of importance to any theory of happiness is the psychological
fact that not all individuals have the same wants and, therefore, not
all would find satisfaction in the same activities. The very fact that
many individuals have wants whose satisfaction would conflict with the
happiness of others makes clear that social unhappiness is a problem
not readily solved.
Another difficulty in the developmeit of a theory of happiness
concerns the question of measurement. Since happiness is a subjective
sense of well-being, is it possible to know whether or not another
individual is happy? Is it possible for an individual to be happy
without knowing it? Aside from the issue of whether or not we can know
the mental states of others, there is also the question of how to
measure happiness over time.
Proponents of eudaemonism would tend to consider a life as a whole
when determining whether or not there is happiness present. Aristotle
argued that an individual should not consider himself truly happy un
til the end of his life because seme tragedy could always destroy the
happiness that he presently enjoys. The hedonistic emphasis on the
ratio of pleasure to pain also requires a period of time in which to
measure happiness, far many short-term pleasures can obviously produce
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a greater long-term pain.
Our search for an objective basis for a general happiness, how
ever, cannot be limited to the identification of a single formula by
which each individual might be happy. The presence of unhappiness in
society is due to many factors, not all of which are rooted in social
antagonisms. Because all happiness or sorrow is subjectively exper
ienced, the most that such a theory oould offer are the social precon
ditions necessary for the possibility of a general happiness.
As we have noted in the introduction, the question of human happi
ness was first addressed by Marcuse in his essay, "On Hedonism". In
it, he described two different versions of the hedonistic philosophy—
the Cyrenaic and the Epicurean. Within the Cyrenaic school, the pur
suit of happiness was secondary to the pursuit of particular plea
sures. According to the exponents of that school, "Particular pleasure
is desirable for its own sake, whereas happiness is not desirable for
its own sake, but for the sake of particular pleasures."2
In addition, the Cyreniacs held that "bodily pleasures are far
better than mental pleasures, and bodily pains are far worse than
mental pains.”3 The only measure of happiness, therefore, was the
individual's iirmediate perception of pleasure or pain.
In contrast to the Cyrenaics, the Epicureans adopted what Marcuse
labeled a 'negative' hedonism. They were not so much interested in
obtaining pleasure as they were in avoiding pain. For that reason,
they "do not choose every pleasure whatsoever, but ofttimes pass over
many pleasures when a greater annoyance ensues from them. "4
For example, Epicurus led a spartan existence and often scoffed at
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the degenerate lifestyles of those who lived only for physical grati
fication. He and his followers practiced moderation in all things and
found the pleasures of the mind to be superior to those of the body.
Marcuse argued that both schools of hedonism developed in response
to the slave economy in the ancient world and to the prevailing unhap
piness which that economy produced. However, the hedonist schools fo
cused their attention on the individual. Only individual pleasures or
pains mattered, and the civic life was something to avoid. He found
fault with hedonism precisely on that account. He noted that, "The
particular interest of the individual, just as it is, is affirmed as
the true interest and is justified against every and all comnunity.... The concrete objectivity of happiness is a concept for which
hedonism finds no evidence."5
According to Marcuse, the failure of hedonism did not lie in its
demand for individual happiness in the face of social injustice, but
in its inability to separate true from false interests. The pleasure
which the master derived from the labor of the slave was quite real.
However, the master-slave relationship was, nevertheless, the source
of much unhappiness in the ancient world.
Any theory which uncritically endorses the pursuit of pleasure or
the avoidance of pain as the only good will be unable to reconcile the
interests of the individual with those of society. Plato had antici
pated this critique of hedonism when he contended that the gratifi
cation of 'bad' pleasures could undermine the social order.
One of the first formulations of the eudaemonistic position was
put forth by Plato, who held that happiness necessarily involves
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knowledge. One must know the good in order to possess it. Because of
the necessary connection between knowledge and happiness in Plato's
philosophy, the quest for knowledge oould not be divorced from the
pursuit of human happiness. This quest for knowledge has since char
acterized the theoretical attitude of all science and philosophy.
For both Plato and Aristotle, theoria meant contemplation of the
universe. Classical theory was related to life in that it sought to
discover the paradigm of order in nature and man as a guide for prac
tical action. Uiis connection between theory and practice resulted in
the interest in ethical concerns far classical theory.
Because of this interest in eudaemonia, philosophers have, in
various ways, attempted to explain the changing and contingent char
acter of experience. Plato developed his theory of universals as an
intellectual response to his uncertain knowledge of the phenomenal
world. He reasoned that while individuals change, certain properties
and ideas remain unchanged. Therecms of geometry, ideals of beauty,
goodness and justice, and laws of nature all persist through change.
Even the self recognizes itself as constant throughout life despite
continual physical and mental changes.
This quest for knowledge led Plato to speculate on the existence
of a realm of forms in which dwelled the ideal forms of which indi
viduals are but imperfect copies. This realm of forms included such
ideas as truth, goodness and beauty. In various dialogues, he express
ed his understanding of the relationship between the forms of exis
tence and the possibility of human happiness. For example, in the
Symposium, Plato described a banquet at which a number of orators are
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asked to explain the nature of Love. The dialogue culminates with the
speech of Socrates which expressed Plato's understanding of the rela
tionship between beauty, time and happiness.
In this dialogue, Socrates relates the instruction he received
from the wise Diotima of Mantineia. Diotima informed Socrates that
Love is neither mortal nor immortal, good nor bad, beautiful nor ugly.
B o m of Poverty and Plenty, Love is always striving after that which
it lacks. However, men do not love the ugly or the bad because only
possession of beauty and good things bring happiness. Because one who
possesses perfect beauty or goodness would want it forever, the ulti
mate object of Love is immortality. For finite creatures, a measure of
immortality may be attained through the 'birth in beauty' of natural
offspring as well as the products of the soul.
Finally, Socrates relates the instruction he received regarding
the proper manner in which to grasp the essence of beauty. Diotima
counseled that,
"he should love one body and there beget beautiful speech;
then he should take notice that the beauty in one body is
akin to the beauty in another body... .When he has learnt
this, he must become the lover of all beautiful bodies....
Next he must believe beauty in souls to be mare precious
than beauty in the body;...that he may moreover be compelled
to contemplate the beauty in our pursuits and customs, and to
see that all beauty is of one and the same kin....Next he
must be led from practice to knowledge,...directing his gaze
from now on towards beauty as a whole. ..and in contemplation
of it give birth to many beautiful and magnificant speeches
and thoughts in the abundance of philosophy."®
Diotima goes on to state that the nature of Beauty is everlast
ing, neither increasing nor diminishing. While beautiful things are
born and perish. Beauty remains unchanged. As such, it is both per-
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feet and inmortal.
For Plato, the Form of Beauty represented an integral aspect of
the most general ground of being. The perfection and inrnartality of
Beauty constitute mankind's highest aspiration, the promise of happi
ness.
Plato's formulation of the nature of happiness deserves some
scrutiny. He began by saying that Love is always striving after that
which it lacks. We want what we do not have. The unhappy man will be
happy only when he has achieved his aims or acquired what he wants.
Conversely, the happy individual wants nothing which he does not have.
Men, however, do not love the ugly or the bad because only beauty
and good things bring happiness. This statement appears at first to be
tautological to the extent that the term 'good' may be defined as that
which we desire. However, Plato's eudaemonism ruled out such a defin
ition. Clearly, he believed that not all that we desire is good.
Plato also maintained that the possession of beauty is a primary
source of happiness. Such a suggestion might appear odd, especially in
light of the negative way poets and other artists are regarded in the
Republic. However, his subsequent delineation between the beauty in
the body and the beauty in the soul makes clear his preference for the
"beautiful and magnificant speeches and thoughts in the abundance of
philosophy."
Finally, Plato argued that inrnartality is the ultimate object of
Love because one who posseses perfect beauty or goodness would want it
forever. Because humans are mortal, however, only a measure of immor
tality can be attained through the birth in beauty of natural off
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spring or the products of the soul. Plato had philosophy in mind here,
and certainly our reception of his works has provided him a measure of
immortality.
Love of immortality characterizes a profound human concern for
self-preservation in the face of death. The fear of death, or of loss
in general, represents a significant obstacle to the pursuit of happi
ness. The relationship between time and happiness, therefore, presents
a central question in any study of the subject.
These observations from the Symposium raise many of the same is
sues addressed by Marcuse in his exploration of the subject of human
happiness. His turn to the aesthetic dimension concurs with Plato's
emphasis on beauty as a source of happiness. In the rejection of he
donism he found an anticipation of the subsequent attempt of Christian
theologians and bourgeois moralists to justify a repressive morality.
Finally, Marcuse's contention that the reality of death presents a
final obstacle to the attainment of happiness is consistent with
Plato's claim that inmartality is our ultimate aim.
The nature of happiness remains problematic. With his contention
that happiness requires knowledge, Marcuse rejected the hedonist equa
tion of pleasure and happiness. His critique of hedonism was based on
the belief that individual satisfaction in the face of general misery
was illusory. Instead, he argued that social justice formed the objec
tive basis far a general happiness. But unlike Plato, Marcuse did not
endeavor to depict the utopian society which reflected his ideal of
justice. Instead, he confined his analysis to the actual conditions of
capitalist society in order to examine the relationship between happi-
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ness and social justice. It is this relationship which guided the de
velopment of his critical theory of society.

HAPPINESS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

The examination of the nature of happiness initiated in the pre
vious chapter indicates a relationship between reason, happiness and
social justice. For Plato and Aristotle the capacity to reason defined
essential human nature. The ability to reason represents a unique
power which separates human beings frcnt other animals. Reason gives
form to experience. Only through the proper use of reason can men ar
rive at a knowledge of the good. Such knowledge is essential if men
are to live happy and virtuous lives. In this way the philosophical
implies the practical and social.
For Plato, to know the good is to do it. Far Aristotle, happiness
results from the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. Both
philosophers maintained that only the proper exercise of reason pro
vided human beings with the knowledge necessary to live well. Both ex
tolled virtue and rejected sensual pleasure as a reliable source of
happiness.
The classicist preoccupation with reason as the expression of
man's essential nature was taken up by Marcuse in his essay, "The
Concept of Essence".-'- In this essay, he demonstrated that philosoph
ical conceptions of human nature have been influenced historically by
existing farms of social organization.
According to Marcuse, Plato and Aristotle understood human essence
as potentiality in conflict with existence. Man's capacity to reason
did not find expression in a rational social order. He observed that,
23
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"The Being of things is not exhausted in what they iirmediately are;
they do not appear as they could be."2
The distinction between essence and appearance is crucial for any
critical social theory. Marcuse stated that things do not appear as
they could be. Existence does not coincide with essence. From Plato
onward, idealist philosophy has never equated the truth of Being with
mere appearance. Likewise, in Marcuse1s critical theory the truth is
defined not by the facts of social existence, but by the ideal possi
bilities which have been repressed by the organization of society.
Marcuse also maintained that, "The essence as potentiality becomes
a farce within existence.

The concept of essence can beccme a

force when it is used to criticize existence in light of its better
possibilities. This same task was taken up by Plato in many of his
dialogues.
In The Republic, far example, Plato used his description of the
ideal state to criticize the Athenian society which had put Socrates
to death. The principle which defines such a state is justice. In the
dialogue, Plato maintained that the good of the individual could not
be separated from the good of society as a whole. If justice is a pre
condition for the general well-being of all citizens, Plato asked
whether or not in all cases the just man is happy? He concluded that
the just man is happy despite the sacrifices he might be required to
make because he lives in a just society which provides for the good of
its citizens.
The interest in social justice produced a tension within classical
theory which could not be resolved within the context of the slave
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economy. However, despite this unresolved tension, classical theory
reflected an accomodation to the social order.
According to Ifercuse, this accomodation was expressed in three
ways. First, Aristotle's delineation of active and passive reason,
with the latter reserved for the slave, reflected the prevailing order
of domination and servitude. Second, his separation of practical from
philosophical knowledge reinforced the belief that happiness is not to
be found in this world. Finally, the other-worldly appeal of both the
Platonic and Aristotelian world-views utilized reason as a means to
repress the erotic and aggressive instincts at work within the human
psyche.
Marcuse took issue with this tendency in classical philosophy to
portray social contradictions as ontological conditions. The accep
tance of slavery and other forms of social domination represented the
retreat of critical reason in the face of an irrational social order.
The very existence of slavery denied the possibility of happiness to
the vast majority of individuals in the ancient world.
Marcuse also rejected Plato's utopian description of an 'ideal'
society which bore little resemblance to the actual conditions of
Greek life. Such a description did not provide the theoretical basis
from which such a society might be established. In the end, Plato con
cluded that justice would never be realized until philosophers became
kings. Obviously, such an admission does not render the Republic a
likely blueprint for social transformation.
Is individual happiness compatible with general misery? Is there
such a state as 'false happiness'? Although it may be argued that
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happiness is strictly an individual concern, Marcuse, like Plato,
maintained that true happiness was impossible without social justice.
Only the creation of a just society could resolve the tension between
essence and existence first expressed in classical philosophy. His
critical theory of society was concerned, therefore, with the real
conditions of existence which might lead to a general happiness. Con
sequently, he branded as 'false' any expression of individual happi
ness which did not concern itself with the happiness of other human
beings.
According to Marcuse, "General happiness presupposes knowledge of
the true interest: that the social life-process be administered in a
manner which brings into harmony the freedom of individuals and the
preservation of the whole on the basis of given objective historical
and natural conditions.”4
As we have seen, it was Marcuse's contention that the appeal to
reason present in classical philosophy co-existed with an irrational
social order. The philosophical contemplation of truth, goodness and
beauty did not provide for a general happiness. On the contrary,
classical philosophy resigned itself to the fact that true happiness
could not be found in this world.
This spirit of resignation grew deeper in the feudal period as
Christian theologians used reason and religion to create an elaborate
idea of the after-life. But unlike Plato's reconciliation of the ten
sion between essence and existence as idealist or utopian philosophy,
Christian theology pacified the tension with the idea of a loving God.
This idea served to reduce social conflict while deferring the premise
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of happiness to the 'other world1.
Subsequently, in the bourgeois era, the philosopher Immanuel Kant
also located the essence of man in his rational capabilities, but his
conception of reason rested upon two distinct conceptions. He defined
reason as both the unifying totality of the cognitive faculty and as
"a single faculty that rises 'above' the understanding, as the faculty
of those 'Ideas' that can never be represented in experience

"5

Marcuse argued that it was only the latter conception of reason—
that of a purely regulative function— which possessed any relation to
freedom in Kant's philosophy. That freedom, of course, was internal.
Freedom was understood as the ability of the subject to give to itself
the universally necessary laws of reason. External to the individual
was a world governed strictly by natural necessity. Consequently, the
critical function of reason was restricted to the realm of morality as
the only realm which could be determined in accordance with the rule
of freedom.
Marcuse interpreted the appeal to reason expressed in the works of
Kant as reflective of the nature of bourgeois society. The universal
freedom proclaimed by that society masked the reality that the 'free'
economic subjects were still controlled by the laws of the commodity
market. The errphasis on duty and morality contained in these works
.underscored the extent to which happiness within society was not some
thing which should be expected. In fact, the pursuit of happiness was
a subversive idea which found expression only in bourgeois art.
Marcuse asserted that because "the beauty of art is compatible
with the bad present," bourgeois art was able to offer happiness in an
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illusory form. Bourgeois culture eternalized the beautiful moment
which could be repeated again and again in the art work. He noted
that, "there is an element of earthly delight in the works of great
bourgeois art.... The individual enjoys beauty, goodness, splendor,
peace and victorious joy. He even enjoys pain and suffering, cruelty
and crime. He experiences liberation."® It is, however, only the
liberation of the moment. Happiness is possible only in the aesthetic
illusion.
The relationship between reason and happiness is a troubling one.
Philosophers since Plato have argued that happiness is dependent upon
the exercise of reason. However, the actual history of Western civil
ization tends to refute the claim that the use of reason might bring
about a general happiness. In fact, the application of reason to
questions of social organization may actually prove to be a greater
source of human unhappiness.
With the philosophers, Marcuse agreed that happiness requires
knowledge; that it is more than the mere feeling of satisfaction. A
general happiness, however, requires more than the exercise of reason.
It requires the creation of a rational society which harmonizes
individual freedom with the need to maintain social order. This task
led Marcuse to writings of Karl Marx and to the theory of revolution.
From Idealism to Materialism
In contrast with the views expressed by such philosophers as
Plato and Kant, the philosopher Karl Marx proposed a radically dif
ferent interpretation of mankind's essential nature. He argued that
the "essence of man is no abstraction inhering in each single indi-
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vidual. In its actuality it is the ensemble of social relation
ships.
With this radical reorientation, Marx's Economic and Philosophi
cal Manuscripts provided a philosophical basis for his critique of
bourgeois political economy. His discussion of alienated labor came in
response not only to questions raised by the philosopher Hegel, but to
the entire tradition of idealist philosophy which had ignored the ac
tual conditions of man's existence in its formulation of the concept
of human happiness. In contrast to the many philosophers who had
sought to explain the world, Marx sought to change it.
The discovery of Marx's materialist dialectic represented a major
turning point in the development of Marcuse's critical theory. As a
student at the University of Freiberg, he adopted much of the idealist
and phenomenological orientation of his professor Martin Heidegger. In
its place, Marx's historical materialism provided a methodology with
which to analyze the actual conditions of man's existence.
Marcuse believed that the materialist dialectic proposed by Marx
held great potential to indict existing society in light of its re
pressed, but better possibilities. Although Hegel had described
alienated labor as a negative reality, his idealistic formulation of
the problem did not provide the basis far radical social change. For
Marx, on the other hand, "the negativity of reality becomes a histor
ical condition which cannot be hypostatized as a metaphysical state of
affairs. In other words, it becomes a social condition, associated
with a particular historical form of society."®
Marx argued that man is a sensuous being whose nature is confirmed
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by the products of his labor as a practical activity. As an objective,
sensuous being, mankind's existence is characterized by neediness and
distress. "Objects are thus not primarily objects of perception, but
of needs, and as such objects of the powers, abilities and instincts
of man."9
Marx's materialism found the confirmation of man's essential
powers only in their objectification. Man does not simply accept the
objective world, he must appropriate it by transforming objects into
the organs of his life. According to Marx, each of man's "relations to
the world— seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, ob
serving, experiencing, wanting, acting, loving— in short, all the
organs of his individual being...are in their orientation to the
object, the appropriation of that object. "-*-0
Human freedom, according to Marx, involves the appropriation and
transformation of objects in order to transcend what is given and preestablished. Through labor, man literally creates himself and his
world. According to Marx, man creates "because he is posited by ob
jects— because at bottom he is nature.

In the act of self-crea

tion, man regards himself as a universal and free being.
Furthermore for Marx, objective reality is also social and histor
ical. He characterized the nature of social relationships in all pre
viously existing societies as one of domination and servitude. Begin
ning with the first division of labor, one class of human beings has
always labored for another. As such, neither class can realize itself
in its labor. In his day, the major social classes were the bour
geoisie and the proletariat.
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Far Marx, the need for the abolition of class society was drawn
directly from his analysis of alienated labor. He held that under cap
italism, the laborer is alienated both from the product of his labor
and from the labor process itself. Because the object which labor pro
duces belongs not to the laborer but to another, it confronts the la
borer as something alien. Consequently, his productive life appears
only as a means to another end. In his Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts, Marx wrote,
"What constitutes the alienation of labour? First, that
the work is external to the worker, that it is not part
of his nature; and that, consequently, he does not ful
fill himself in his work but denies himself, has a feel
ing of misery rather than well-being, does not develop
freely his mental and physical energies but is physically
exhausted and martally debased. The worker, therefore,
feels himself at heme only during his leisure time, where
as at work he feels homeless. His work is not voluntary
but inposed, forced labour. It is not the satisfaction of
a need, but only a means for satisfying other needs. Its
alien character is clearly shown by the fact that as soon
as there is no physical or other compulsion it is avoided
like the plague....Finally, the external character of work
for the worker is shown by the fact that it is not his own
work but work for someone else, that in work he does not be
long to himself but to another p e r s o n . "12
According to Marx, the alienation of labor leads to other forms
of alienation, including the alienation from nature, from other human
beings, and from the species being which binds humans into community.
For Marx, historical materialism represented a 'real humanism' which
grasped the alienation of labor as a practical problem. Because he
defined labor as man's essartial nature, Marx equated humanism with
naturalism. The alienation of labor, therefore, calls into question
the very nature of man.
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The implications of Marx's theory of alienation for the problem of
human happiness are clear. First, Marx understood that the possibility
of human happiness relied upon the actual state of social conditions.
Since objective reality is social and historical, the present form of
objective reality must be superseded before a new form can exist.
Therefore, he called for a revolution of the proletariat as the only
means by which a general happiness could be achieved.
Further, Marx maintained that communism represented the resolution
of the tension between essence and existence which first appeared in
classical philosophy. Under ccrtmunism there would be "the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and
man— the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence,
between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and
necessity* between the individual and the species."13
While such a pronouncement appears incorrect in light of subse
quent historical development, the abolition of alienated labor and
class society became the object of Marcuse's critical theory. Writing
in 1932 on the subject of Marx's Manuscripts, he proclaimed that,
"Capitalism is characterized not merely by economic or political cri
sis but by a catastrophe affecting the human essence... (which) re
quires the catacylsmic transcendence of the actual situation through
total revolution."14
In the initial formulations of his critical theory, Marcuse main
tained that the realization of reason in society would mean the disap
pearance of philosophy. He argued that materialism reversed the orien
tation of all previous conceptions of man. In Marxism, "the idea of
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reason has been superseded by the idea of

happiness."

15

In contrast to traditional philosophy, Marcuse insisted that in
his critical theory, "The philosophical construction of reason is
replaced by the creation of a rational society."!^ His demand of
reason required the creation of a social organization in which indi
viduals could collectively regulate their lives in accordance with
their needs. It was this emphasis on social revolution as the means to
a general happiness which animated Marcuse's critical theory of
society.

THE CRITICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

Herbert Marcuse developed his critical theory of society while a
member of the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt. Established
in 1923/ Institute members published both empirical and theoretical
studies of the social/ economic, political, psychological and philo
sophical issues of modem society. In 1937, Director Max Horkheixner
coined the term 'critical theory1 to describe the common methodology
employed by Institute members.^
Marcuse, came to the Frankfurt Institute from the University of
Freiberg where he studied under the philosopher Martin Heidegger.
German idealism and Heidegger's phenomenological approach both in
fluenced the initial development of Marcuse's philosophy. As we have
seen, his discovery of Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
in 1932 radically shifted the focus of his study from questions of
human authenticity to ones of social transformation.
Marcuse contended that in the materialist dialectic, reality is
the totality of the relations of production. Its content is the main
tenance and reproduction of society as a whole. Its form is the real
ization of capital. This form, however, is only a particular histori
cal pattern in which the content may be realized. He held that the
existing content is reality in a 'bad' form.2
Nonetheless, while adopting Marx's materialist dialectic, Marcuse
did not abandon the critical insights he found in idealist philosophy.
His emerging critical theory sought instead to combine a critical ra34
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tionality with the historical analysis of man's social, economic and
political existence in order to establish a framework in which the
subject of human happiness could be explored.
Writing in the 1930's, Marcuse believed that the real potential
ities for the fulfillment of human life were at hand. The relative
success of capitalism in overcaning material scarcity had provided the
level of economic development which Marx claimed was necessary for so
cialist transformation. Marcuse believed that human fulfillment would
be determined by such factors as the control of natural and social
productive farces, the development of needs in relation to the possi
bility of their satisfaction, and the availability and wealth of cul
tural values.^
Above all, Marcuse believed that democratic social planning would
enable the associated individuals to freely decide what was to be pro
duced and how the wealth of society would be distributed. This empha
sis on democracy and the autonomy of associated individuals character
ized Marcuse's vision of the rational society. The purpose of his cri
tical theory, therefore, was to explore the actual tendencies within
capitalist society which could provide the basis for the realization
of such a society.
The optimism of the 1930's soon gave way to horror, however, as
the rise of fascism forced Marcuse and other Institute members to flee
Germany for the United States. He later noted that his pre-Auschwitz
writings were deeply separated from everything which was to follow. He
observed that, "the concern with philosophy expressed in these essays
was already, in the thirties, a concern with the past: remembrance of
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something that at seme point had lost its reality.... Precisely at
that time, beaten or betrayed, the social forces in which freedom and
revolution were joined were delivered over to the existing powers."4
The failure of proletarian revolution in Western Europe did not
lead Marcuse to reject Marxism. It did, however, cause him to careful
ly examine the existing powers which stood in the way of social revo
lution. Obviously, the bourgeoisie as the dominant social class op
posed the revolution. The rise of fascism, however, represented a
development far more barbaric than mere class conflict. It more close
ly resembled what Horkheimer and others later referred to as an
'eclipse of reason'.
Marcuse's interest in the relationship between reason and happi
ness led to the development of a critique of what he now termed the
'philosophy of reason'. A primary focus of this critique dealt with
the application of scientific reason to questions of social organiza
tion. He argued that the relationship between reason and technology
raised particularly serious issues which called into question the
supposed rational self-interest of individuals.
Marcuse defined scientific rationality as that use of reason
which, by quantifying nature, separates the true from the good,
science from ethics. Universal ideas are refuted a priori by scien
tific reason. They beccme "mere ideals, and their concrete content
evaporates.
Scientific rationality proposes to remove the interest of the
observing subject from the object of his study. But, according to
Marcuse, the disinterestedness of science betrays its appropriation by
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the forces which control society. Because knowledge had always existed
within a political context, the application of science to technology
necessarily involves either an extension or a subversion of the
existing political order.
For Marcuse, technology meant far mare than just the tools and
methods of production. It was also a means of organizing social re
lationships and projecting a world. Not only had technology permitted
the conquest of nature, it had redefined our conception of nature.
Thus, Marx's equation of humanism and naturalism had been replaced
with the conception of nature as a mere object of utility.
Marcuse further contended that the farces which control society
have used technology to bolster social domination. He held that when
the domination of man is accomplished through the use of technology,
scientific rationality becomes technological rationality. For Marcuse,
technological rationality represented the constriction of reason to
the needs of the technical apparatus. No longer is the fulfillment of
human interests the ultimate purpose of reason. Rather, the rational
is defined in terms of what serves the interest of the apparatus.
Marx had argued that the alienation of the laborer from the pro
duct of his labor led to the fetishism of commodities in which a "def
inite social relation between men., .assumes., .the fantastic form of a
relation between t h i n g s . T h e fetishism of ccmmodities conceals the
true nature of capitalism as a system of domination and servitude.
In Marcuse's formulation the fetish of technique, or technical
efficiency, had replaced commodity fetishism as the predominant form
of mystification in the modem world.7 According to Marcuse, social
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organization as a whole reflects a technological a priori which de
fines all social relationships in terms of technical efficiency. As a
consequence, individuals develop a 'matter-of-fact' attitude which
does not question the efficacy of technological rationality itself.
While matter-of-factness itself was certainly not new, the social or
ganization which it defined has changed considerably. Marcuse asserted
that,
"Matter-of-factness animated ancient materialism and hedon
ism, it was responsible in the struggle of modem physical
science against spiritual oppression, and in the revolu
tionary rationalism of the Enlightenment. The new attitude
differs from ail these in the highly rational compliance
which typifies it. The facts directing man's thought and
action are not those of a nature which must be accepted in
order to be mastered, or those of society which must be
changed because they no longer correspond to human needs
and potentialities. Rather are they those of the machine
process, which itself appears the embodiment of rationality
and expediency."8
Marcuse argued that the organization of modem society reflects a
machine process which subordinates individual differences to a common
framework of standardized performances. The pursuit of profit dic
tates the quantity, form and kind of commodities which are produced
and the skills of the individual laborer tend to be reduced to a ser
ies of "semi-spontaneous reactions to prescribed mechanical norms."9
This characterization of modem society as a machine process sug
gests the extent to which Marcuse believed that we have lost sight of
human happiness as the proper end of society. The pervasiveness of
technological rationality masks the irrationality of contemporary life
and blocks efforts to understand the source of our unhappiness.
The application of technological rationality within society finds
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perhaps its clearest expression in bureaucracy. Marcuse cited Weber's
dictum that, "'In contrast to the democratic self-administration of
small homogeneous units', bureacracy is 'the universal concordtant of
modem mass democracy.'”10

The development of bureaucratic organi

zation is also the universal concordtant of the technical apparatus.
Bureacratization embodies the whole of the advanced capitalist and
socialist world. It is central to both public and private organiza
tion, to the ruling elite and to the official opposition. Bureacracies
function hierarchically in order to regulate, control, enhance, and
maintain the efficient utilization of resources— both human and
natural— within a society defined by the economic performances of its
members.
Although the bureaucratization of society is hardly synonomous
with fascism, Marcuse did believe that technological rationality was
cannon to both farms of organization. He argued that fascism repre
sented an extreme form of bureacratic organization guided by techno
logical rationality.
According to Marcuse, the reign of terror in National Socialist
Germany was sustained not only by brute force but also by "the ingen
ious manipulation of the power inherent in technology: the intensifi
cation of labor, propaganda, the training of youths and workers, the
organization of the governmental, industrial and party bureaucracy...
follow the lines of greatest technological efficiency."-^Thus, technological rationality, unchecked by any overriding
concern for the happiness of humanity, culminates in the authori
tarian state. By equating reason with the needs of technical ef-

40

ficiency, the farces which control the authoritarian state are capable
of transforming the rational self-interest of individuals into compli
ance with the demands of the state. In this manner, the connection be
tween reason and happiness, the object of philosophy from the begin
ning of Western civilization, is severed.
Marcuse did acknowledge that within a liberal democracy, economic
farces cannot coirpel consumers to purchase their products. With the
techniques developed from psychological and marketing studies, how
ever, the loyalty of the consumer is elicited in a more subtle manner.
Conformity is won with the appearance of freedom. Happiness has been
replaced with the temporary gratification of manufactured needs.
In sum, this critique of technological rationality as a form of
mystification and domination went to the heart of his concern for
human happiness. Happiness involves knowledge; it requires the exer
cise of human reason in a world free from fear, want and anxiety. The
technical apparatus, however, has redefined human reason as technical
efficiency. Man's creation has displaced the development of his essen
tial capacities as the telos of life. Consequently, technology cannot
deliver the happiness it promises because individual happiness is no
longer the goal of reason. As long as man's reason is applied only to
questions of technical efficiency, it is powerless to criticize and
transcend existing social relationships.
However, while his rejection of technological rationality was
unwavering, Marcuse's attitude toward technology itself was ambiva
lent. He never renounced the possibility that mechanization could
shift the focus of labor away from the necessities of production to an
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arena of free human realization. The reduction of scarcity and the
abolition of competitive pursuits could provide the basis for greater
social freedom. While it could not guarantee perennial happiness, it
would mean a reduction in the alienation of labor, freedom from want,
and a greater chance for the fullest development of human capabili
ties.
The critique of technological rationality and the philosophy of
reason fanned a cornerstone of Marcuse's critical theory of society.
He viewed the goal of technical efficiency as a dangerous challenge to
the goal of social justice and human happiness. Furthermore, the
failure of proletarian revolution and the rise of fascism strongly
suggested to Marcuse that the problem of human happiness required a
closer examination of the human psyche. It was at this point that he
began his inquiry into Freud1s metapsychology.

THE DEATH INSTINCT

In the preceeding chapter we discussed Marcuse's critique of tech
nological rationality as an obstacle to social revolution and its im
plied premise of human happiness. The fetishism of technical efficien
cy provides an explanation for the separation of reason from the pur
suit of happiness. However, the experience of fascism represented for
Marcuse an even mere serious obstacle to the realization of a rational
society. For fascism was possible only as a result of the acquiesence
of a large segment of the working class. In his search far an explana
tion of this behavior Marcuse turned his attention to the works of
Freud.
Freud's metapsychology presented a serious challenge to the sup
posed rationality of the human subject. Freudian theory reached to the
care of Western conceptions of the self and constructed a system in
which the interaction of instinctual forces could serve to explain
human behavior.
Although several members of the Frankfurt Institute were deeply
involved with Freud's work, Marcuse did not focus his attention on it
until after 1940. Earlier work by Erich Fromm and Theodor Adorno cen
tered on Freud's discussion of ideology and his theory of group behav
ior. It was Freud's theory of instinctive behavior, however, which
greatly interested Marcuse. Of particular concern to him was the pos
tulate of a death instinct present in organic life since its origin.
Freud's theory developed gradually as a result of his clinical
42
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observations and his metapsychological speculations. He defined in
stinct as "an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier
state of things which the living entity has been obliged to abandon
under the pressure of external disturbing forces."!
The 'earlier state of things' to which Freud referred was the
inorganic state. His clinical observations led him to conclude that,
"The dominating tendaicy of mental life, and perhaps of nervous life
in general, is the effort to reduce, to keep constant or to remove in
ternal tension due to stimuli...and our recognition of that fact is
one of our strongest reasons for believing in the existence of death
instincts."2
Freud's hypothesis of a death instinct was first proposed in
Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Patients' accounts of the repitition of
traumatic dreams and painful behavior patterns led him to posit the
existence of an instinct which opposed the pleasure principle. Freud
proposed that a death instinct could explain the inclination to pain
present in such experiences. The existence of sadomasochism also pro
vided evidence of the fusion of sexual, aggressive and self-destruc
tive instincts.
In addition to a death instinct, Freud also believed that the in
clination to aggression represented "an original, self-subsisting in
stinctual disposition in man (and) it constitutes the greatest imped
iment to civilization."^ Because of man's innate aggressivess Freud
believed that civilization was necessarily built upon the repression
of the human instinctual constitution.
111 Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud traced the maturation of
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his instinct theory from its initial division of the ego and sexual
instincts. With his hypothesis of narcissistic libido, the sexual in
stinct was transformed into Eros, "which seeks to force together and
hold together the portions of living substance.Sexuality desig
nated that portion of Eros which is directed toward objects.
Freud speculated that Eros operates from the beginning of life as
a 'life instinct1 in opposition to a "'death instinct' which was
brought into being by the coming to life of inorganic substance. "5
Freud wrote that his original characterization of the ego in
stincts as separate from the sexual instincts was challenged by his
realization that a portion of the ego instincts had a libidinal qual
ity which took the subject's own ego as its object. "These narcissis
tic self-preservative instincts had thenoe-fcrward to be counted among
the libidinal sexual instincts."®
The distinction between the ego and sexual instincts was thus
transformed into one between ego and object instincts, both of which
were of a libidinal nature. Freud explained that at this point a new
opposition emerged between the libidinal instincts and the instincts
at work in destructive behavior. He referred to this opposition as one
between the life instincts (Eros) and the death instincts (Thanatos).
The theory of the death instinct and man's natural aggressiveness
were highly controversial features of Freud's metapsychology. Seme an
alysts, such as Froirm, completely discounted this feature of Freud's
work. Wilhelm Reich, on the other hand, argued vehemently that all
forms of aggression could be reduced to repressed sexuality. His doc
trine of social liberation emphasized the primacy of sexuality as a
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cure for aggressiveness.
Although Marcuse appropriated Freud's theory of a death instinct,
his application of it remains somewhat obscure. In Eros and Civiliza
tion, he argued that the ultimate goal of the instinct is pleasure and
not death. "If the instinct's basic objective is not the termination
of life but of pain— the absence of tension— then paradoxically, in
terms of the instinct, the conflict between life and death is the more
i

reduced, the closer life approximates the state of gratification....
Death would cease to be an instinctual goal.
Although Marcuse accepted the fact that the instincts were essen
tially conservative, he rejected Freud's designation of them as largely immutable. Rather, he argued that the aggressiveness which Freud
found to be innate in man represented no more than a depiction of the
domination present historically within class societies. Accordingly, a change in social organization could result in a historical modifica
tion of man's instinctual constitution.
Marcuse also appropriated several other features of Freud's meta
psychology which provided insights into human instinctive behavior,
for one the Freudian division of the human psyche into id, ego and
superego. With this division, Freud had atteirpted to explain the in
teraction of instinctual and societal farces on the individual.
The id is the most archaic structure of the psyche. It is governed
entirely by the pleasure principle, Freud's term for the urge which
seeks a diminution of the quantity of excitation.®
The ego represents the self-conscious organization of the human
personality. The existence of scarcity has led to the emergence of a
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reality principle which requires the ego to postpone or abandon many
of the pleasures sought by the id in the interest of self-preserva
tion.
The superego represents the structure of personality which incor
porates society's demands on the individual. According to Freud, the
need to establish and enforce order requires the repression of aggres
sive tendencies in individuals. This introjection of aggresion pro
duces conscience, the sense of guilt and the need for punishment.9
The demands of the superego struggle against the urges of the id for
control of the ego.
Freud noted that in the process of maturation our sense of ego
changes significantly. For the infant "the ego includes everything,
later it separates off an external world from itself. Our present egofeeling is, therefore, only a shrunken residue of a much more inclu
sive— indeed, an all-embracing— feeling which corresponded to a much
more intimate bond between the ego and the world about it."-'-®
Freud called this feeling 'oceanic1 and referred to the impulse to
return to such a state as the Nirvana principle. Marcuse speculated
that, "Perhaps the taboo on incest was the first great protection
against the death instinct: the taboo on Nirvana, on the regressive
impulse for peace which stood in the way of progress, of Life it
self."11
According to Freud's evolutionary theory, at the genesis of or
ganic life is the realization that life is less 'satisfactory', or
more painful than the preceeding inorganic stage. This awareness
generates the death instinct as "the drive for relieving this tension
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through regression. "12 Such a realization is often alluded to as the
cause of birth trauma and of the desire of infants to return to the
womb.
The next turning point in Freud's theory occurs with his analysis
of the origin of civilization whereby the existence of scarcity farced
the repressive control of the instincts. Freud speculated that the
first human group was dominated by the father on the basis of his
physical prowess. In this primal horde, the father monopolized the
women while the instinctual energy of his sons was diverted to work.
Eventually, their repression culminated in a rebellion in which they
collectively killed aid devoured the father and established the
brother clan.
There was an ambivalence in the brother's attitude toward their
father, however. Their hatred was mixed with admiration and affection
because the father provided the order necessary to maintain their
group. Their collective guilt felt upon the destruction of this order
led them to deify the father and to establish a sexual taboo enforced
by the clan as a whole.13
Freud's general theory of social evolution was very much informed
by the above speculation. He believed the presence of guilt to be cen
tral to the subsequent development of civilization. Although this
speculation is beyond the reaim of anthropolgical verification, it was
accepted by Marcuse for its symbolic value. What is mare, he asserted
that the alleged consequences of these events are historical facts.
*

*

*

*

*

The publication in 1955 of Eros and Civilization marked the first
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real attempt to.reconcile Freud's metapsychology/ especially the death
instinct, with Marxism and the Western philosophical tradition.
Although neither Marx nor the proletariat are even mentioned in the
first edition of this work, the critical insights of Marxism were
incorporated into Marcuse's general framework.
We must acknowledge that Marcuse's extrapolation has not been
without its detractors. His adoption of Freud's metapsychological
speculations has been criticized as unscientific. His use of psycho
analytic terminology was at times imprecise and inconsistent. These
objections notwithstanding, the thesis of this work is essential to
any study of the question of human happiness. By reconciling the in
sights of Marx and Freud, it was Marcuse's intention to demonstrate
that a non-repressive civilization was theoretically possible.
Marcuse began his introduction to Eros and Civilization with the
observation that, "Sigmund Freud's proposition that civilization is
based on the permanent subjugation of the human instincts has been
taken for granted. "I4 While adopting many of the speculations of
Freud's metapsychology, Marcuse sought to overcome the apparent biologism of the Freudian system. It was his contention that tinder the
'ideal' conditions of mature industrial society, it would be possible
to gradually reduce the level of instinctual repression.
For Freud, the struggle for existence represented an eternal con
dition of mankind. The presence of scarcity led to the emergence of a
reality principle which repressed the instinctual demands of the id.
Marcuse accepted the fact that "scarcity teaches men that they cannot
freely gratify their instinctual impulses."15 what he rejected was
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the contortion that scarcity depicted the eternal fate of mankind.
The fact of material scarcity provides an explanation for the
genesis of repression and domination. Material privation has led to
the division of labor, class society and the repression of instinctual
gratification. For Marcuse, however, the mere fact of scarcity did not
prove the necessity of repression or domination. Anthropological stud
ies, for example, have verified the existence of archaic societies
which have been peaceful and egalitarian.
It was Marcuse's intention to demonstrate that at the attained
level of mature industrial society, an order of abundance could
eliminate the repression and dcmination enforced by past orders of
scarcity. To accomplish this task he combined Marxian political
economy with Freudian metapsychology in order to examine the social
basis far instinctual liberation.

INSTINCTUAL LIBERATION

In the works that followed the publication of Eros and Civiliza
tion, Marcuse developed his contention that the carder of domination
promoted by scarcity could be abolished because of the success of sci
ence and technology. In An Essay on Liberation, he argued that what is
needed is "not the arrest or reduction of technical progress, but the
elimination of those features which perpetuate man's subjection to the
apparatus."1 The emergence of new needs which capitalism cannot sat
isfy would, accordingly, lead to the development of an essentially new
science and technology.
The influence of Freudian theory persisted in Marcuse's analysis
of capitalist society. In Eros and Civilization, he defined repression
as "restraint, constraint and suppression."2 His usage of the term
was not strictly psychoanlytic, however, and its meaning shifted in
different contexts. 'Surplus repression' was defined as "the restric
tions necessitated by social domination" as opposed to those of ratio
nal authority. A particular group or individual may exercise domina
tion "in order to sustain or enhance itself in a privileged posi
tion."3
Similarly, Marcuse coined the term 'performance principle' to
describe the prevailing historical form of the reality principle and
with this term he argued that individuals are judged in this society
by virtue of their competitive economic performances.4 Although
couched in the language of psychoanalysis, his critique of domination
50
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was consistent with his Marxian analysis of class society.
Unlike Marx, however, Marcuse's indictment of social domination
focused on the success of the capitalist system to assimilate its op
ponents with the promise of an ever-increasing material standard of
living. As early as 1941, Marcuse had argued that the proletariat no
longer represented the determinate negation of society and that "the
cooordinated masses do not crave a new social order but only a larger
share in the prevailing one. "5 Consequently, if the working class is
to beccme radicalized, the catalysts of change must cone from outside
its ranks.
As it developed in the 1960's, Marcuse's critique of advanced cap
italist society was based on three points. First, the permanent pre
paration for war necessitates the expenditure of huge sums of money
for weapons of destruction which postpone the abolition of scarcity
while eliminating any real sense of security.
Second, the level of capitalist development is uneven and has gen
erated what is today referred to as a permanent underclass consisting
of the dispossessed and unemployable outcasts of society. For these
individuals the success of the system represents the very negation of
their humanity.
Finally, the needs generated in capitalist society are 'false' be
cause their satisfaction represses other 'higher' needs. Such higher
needs would involve the intellectual and aesthetic aspirations of hu
manity as well as the realization of solidarity with other human
beings.
Although it is not possible to fully explore Marcuse's theory of
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needs, he did maintain that it was possible to objectively distinguish
true from false needs. The ability to satisfy true human needs would
coincide with the creation of a rational society which harmonizes the
interests of individual freedom with those of social order. His thesis
of a non-repressive civilization was predicated on the attainment of a
social order in which the free expression of human drives and the sat
isfaction of true human needs has eliminated the basis for aggressive
ness.
Marcuse's thesis of a non-repressive civilization was called into
question, however, by what Freud had described as the 'fatal dialectic
of civilization'. This dialectic described the process by which the
advances of society require ever greater repression which threatens,
in turn, to unleash ever great destructiveness. If civilization does
depend upon the permanent subjugation of the human instincts as Freud
had asserted then any hope for instinctual liberation is illusory.
Although Marcuse acknowledged that cruelty and mass annihilation
have increased along with the highest achievements of culture, he re
fused to accept that claim that civilization is built upon instinctual
repression. His search for a human faculty free from the repressive
control of the prevailing reality principle led him to the imagina
tion.
Pursuing Freud's contention that the imagination was the only hu
man faculty still committed to the pursuit of pleasure, Marcuse noted
the decisive function the imagination plays in the total mental struc
ture. "It links the deepest layers of the unconscious with the highest
products of consciousness (art), the dream with the reality; it pre
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serves the archetypes of the genus, the perpetual but repressed ideas
of the collective and individual memory, the tabooed images of free
dom. 6
But, despite the critical role which Marcuse assigned to the imag
ination, he also acknowledged its subservience to the reality princi
ple. According to Marcuse, when the reality principle takes root,
"reason prevails: it becomes unpleasant but useful and correct; phan
tasy remains pleasant but becomes useless, untrue— a mere play, day
dreaming. "7
Nevertheless, the role of the imagination remains essential to any
possible reconciliation of reason and happiness. The imagination rein
vigorates the tension between existence and essence, between the ac
tual and the possible. According to Marcuse, the cognitive function of
the imagination reveals the aesthetic form as the actual expression of
the pleasure principle. He asserted that, "Behind the aesthetic form
lies the repressed harmony of sensuousness and reason— the eternal
protest against the organization of life by the logic of domination,
the critique of the performance principle."®
This critique of the performance principle was based on his claim
that the order of abundance achieved in the advanced industrial na
tions had created "transcending needs which cannot be satisfied with
out abolishing the capitalist mode of production. "9 The satisfaction
of these new needs would replace the performance principle with an
aesthetic ethos as the new reality principle.
As he developed the critique, Marcuse envisioned a new sensibility
which would affirm the "ascent of the life instincts over aggressive
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ness and guilt" by creating "a vital need for the abolition of injus
tice and misery.

This sensibility would be guided by the imagin

ation and technique would tend toward art. The sensuous, the playful,
the calm and the beautiful characterized the aesthetic ethos which
Marcuse believed would replace the prevailing performance principle.
Marcuse's concern far the development of a new sensibility also
led him him to re-examine the possible role of human sexuality in his
aesthetic ethos. Sexuality as a farm of play was central to Marcuse's
critical theory. While Freud had pointed to the fusion of the sex in
stincts with aggressiveness as one explanation for society's hostility
toward sexuality, Marcuse maintained that "the sex instincts bear the
brunt of the reality principle. Their organization culminates in the
subjection of the partial sex instincts to the primacy of genitality,
and in their subjugation under the function of procreation."H
Marcuse's rejection of genitality stemmed from what he saw as the
resultant desexualization of the remainder of the body. In place of
genitality, he advocated pregenital polymorphus perversity which would
eroticize the entire personality. He believed that the perversions up
held "sexuality as an end in itself.. .against the subjugation of sexu
ality under the order of procreation, and against the institutions
which guarantee this

o r d e r . "12

Marcuse's elevation of the perversions, or partial sex instincts,
was an extremely controversial feature of his call far instinctual
liberation. Although rejected by Marxists and Freudians alike, Marcuse
maintained that genital sexuality reinforced the repressive institu
tions of society by linking sexuality to procreation and the patri-
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archal family. While this criticism was perhaps overly broad, it did
underscore his conviction that Eros must not be confined to procre
ation.
Marcuse's call far instinctual liberation also included the ex
tension of libidinal relations into all areas of life including the
order of work. Although Freud recognized the libidinal character of
work relations, he held that aim-inhibited sexuality was still a form
of instinctual repression. Marcuse, on the other hand, believed that
the extension of libidinal relations into the order of work would make
work "gratifying in itself without losing its work content. "13 He
contended that work as play could not be subject to any administra
tion.
Marcuse held that the extension of libidinal relations into the
order of work could actually create a realm of freedom through work
activity. He remarked that, "The social expression of the liberated
work instinct is cooperation which, grounded in solidarity, directs
the organization of the realm of necessity and the development of the
realm of freedom."!4
The idea of work as play may have been the most utopian of Mar
cuse's conceptions. It was never really thematized after Eros and
Civilization and its realization would appear to rest upon the aboli
tion of the realm of necessity. As long as scarcity and competition
define the world of work it is hard to imagine anything but the most
creative of pursuits as gratifying in itself.
In addition to its implications for aesthetics and sexuality,
Marcuse's conception of instinctual liberation also envisioned the
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reconciliation of man and nature. In his search for a new cultural
model he turned to Greek mythology and the figures of Narcissus and
Orpheus. He observed that, "Theirs is the image of joy and fulfill
ment... the redemption of pleasure, the half of time, the absorption of
death; silence, sleep, night, paradise."I5
In these myths the harmony of man and nature is restored. "In
being spoken to, loved, and cared for, flowers and springs and animals
appear as what they are— beautiful, not only for those who address and
regard them, but for themselves, objectively."
Marcuse's depiction of man's reconciliation with the natural world
challenged the necessity of the performance principle. His new sensi
bility expressed the ascent of Eros, or the life instincts, over the
aggressive and self-destructive instincts. It envisioned human soli
darity, environmental harmony, the preservation of joy, and the aboli
tion of alienation, want and privation.
Marcuse's conception of a new sensibility also called for a new
relationship with nature which would be free from domination and all
ideas of utility. The idea of 1letting-be' or surrender characterized
an essentially passive or receptive relationship to the natural world.
At the same time, however, he acknowledged that receptivity meets the
resistance of matter in that "nature is not a manifestation of
'spirit', but rather its essential limit."17
This acknowledgement of the limits of receptivity may also be ap
plied to the entire conception of instinctual liberation. While Mar
cuse's call for a new science and a new technology might redefine
man's relation to nature, it could not eliminate all ideas of utility.
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Likewise, even his most optimistic vision of instinctual liberation
was conditioned by his acceptance of death as the ultimate barrier to
lasting gratification.
111 Eros and Civilization, Marcuse concluded that, "The brute fact
of death denies once and far all the reality of a non-repressive exis
tence....Timelessness is the ideal of pleasure....But the ego... is in
its entirety subject to time....The flux of time helps men to forget
what was and what can be: it makes them oblivious to the better past
and the better future.
Against the surrender to time, he proposed "the restoration of
remembrance to its rights, as a vehicle of liberation...."^
Marcuse's emphasis on remembrance, however, was not meant to invoke
any golden past or even the innocence of youth. Instead, he claimed
that it represented the attempt to reassemble the fragments of joy and
truth which can be found in a distorted humanity and a distorted na
ture. For Marcuse, the expression of that repressed truth was confined
to authentic works of art. It was, therefore, to the aesthetic dimen
sion and the idea of Beauty that he returned in his inquiry into the
possibility of human happiness.

THE AESTHETIC DIMENSION

The relationship between beauty and happiness was a central theme
in Marcuse's critical theory from its inception. While a member of the
Frankfurt Institute, he analyzed the 'beautiful illusion' present in
bourgeois art. In Eros and Civilization, he linked aesthetic form to
the pursuit of pleasure which has been repressed by the performance
principle. In One-Dimensional Man, he appropriated Whitehead's defin
ition of art as the determinate negation of society, thereby replacing
Marx's proletariat as the primary source of opposition.!
The development of Marcuse's aesthetic ethos was influenced con
siderably by the aesthetic theories of Irrmanual Kant and Friedrich
Schiller. In his Critique of Judgment, Kant described aesthetic
judgment as the 'middle term' between reason and the understanding.
He held that contemplation of beautiful objects stimulated the harmon
ious interplay of the understanding and the imagination. Beauty was
designated as 'purposiveness without purpose'. Just as truth was the
object of theoretical reason and goodness the object of practical
reason, beauty was the object of aesthetic judgment. Like truth and
goodness, beauty was for Kant a symbolic representation of freedcm.2
Turning to Schiller, Marcuse observed that, "Only because beauty
is a necessary condition of humanity can the aesthetic function play a
decisive role in reshaping civilization....In a truly free civiliza
tion, all laws are self-given by the individuals: 'to give freedom by
freedom is the universal law' of the aesthetic state...."2
58
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In contrast to the predominant thought of the bourgeois period,
Schiller introduced the concept of the play inpulse as an alternative
to toil. Its object was beauty, its goal freedom. Marcuse argued that,
"In a genuinely humane civilization, the .human existence will be play
rather than toil, and man will live in display rather than need."4
But since time is the fatal enemy of lasting gratification,
Schiller attributed to the play impulse the function of "'abolishing
time in time', of reconciling being and becoming; change and iden
tity. '

Schiller's call for the timeless possession of beauty

echoed the instruction which Socrates received from Diotima. All love
is ultimately love of immortality.
In works such as An Essay on Liberation, Counter-Revolution and
Revolt and The Aesthetic Dimension, the relationship between beauty
and the possibility of happiness was increasingly thematized. In these
works, Marcuse asserted that radical social change depended upon the
emergence of a new aesthetic sensibility. He held that, "radical
change in consciousness is the beginning, the first step in changing
gocial existence: emergence of the new Subject."6
The new sensibility which Marcuse advocated required a new lan
guage and a new mode of perceiving the world. In order to project a
sensibility free from all forms of domination, he turned to poetry and
surrealism as aethethic forms which could "dissolve the very structure
of perception.
This emphasis on aesthetic form, as opposed to the content of the
art work, placed Marcuse outside of the mainstream of Marxist aesthet
ics . In The Aesthetic Dimension, he flatly rejected the claim that the
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authenticity of a work of art is directly related to its political
content. Instead, he argued that, "The fact that a work truly repre
sents the interests or the outlook of the proletariat or of the bour
geoisie does not yet make it an authentic work of art. "8
For Marcuse, the truth of an art work is measured by its content
having becone form. Aesthetic form is defined by those qualities which
make a work a self-contained whole with a structure and order of its
own. Aesthetic form transforms reality into illusion and in so doing
affirms its commitment to Beauty as the ultimate truth of all art.
Marcuse criticized Marxist aesthetics for ignoring the idea of
Beauty in its enphasis on the political content of the art work. He
insisted that although the Greek tragedy or the medieval epic, for ex
ample, have nothing to do with the interests of the proletariat, we
nevertheless experience them as authentic works. He maintained that
because such works convey a truth about the human condition they are
authentic irregardless of the political outlook of the author.
While writers such as Sartre and Brecht insisted that revolution
ary art must speak the language of the people, Marcuse contended that
it may be necessary to stand against the people in order to bring
about the necessary rupture with existing society. He argued that,
"Revolutionary art may well become 'The Enemy of the People,'” in its
insistence on a sensibility and social organization which 'the people'
do not want.^
Marcuse suggested that there may be more revolutionary potential
in the poetry of Baudelaire or Rimbaud than in the didactic plays of
Brecht. In fact, he even argued that, "Art can express its radical
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potential only as art....Art cannot represent the revolution, it can
only invoke it in another medium."10 For Marcuse, the necessity of
revolution is given a priori in the authentic work. To make "the Revo
lution' thematic as proposed by the advocates of socialist realism
only threatens to reduce authetic art to a form of propaganda.
The revolutionary character of authentic art was confirmed far
Marcuse by the fact that art, by its very commitment to beauty, in
dicts existing society. The indictment estranges its audience from
their everyday lives without offering any siirple, practical means of
reforming their lives. In Beckett's plays, for example, no hope is
offered in the political sense, only the message that existing reality
must come to an end. Likewise, Kafka's prose shatters the reasonable
ness of the established order.
Marcuse argued that, "The indictment is just as much in the sen
suous, emotional language of Vferther and the Fleurs du Mai as it is in
the hardness of Stendahl and Kafka. " H Art is able to indict reality
precisely because it is unreal. As illusion, art can freely portray
th= unfreedom of individuals in an unfree society.
The commitment of art to aesthetic form, however, also weakens the
indictment contained in the authentic work. According to Marcuse, "The
very commitment of art to.form vitiates the negation of unfreedom in
art....The form of the work of art invests the content with qualities
of enjoyment...."12 This enjoyment derives from the beautiful illu
sion which the work presents. The resulting catharsis reduces the
sense of estrangement and the need to change reality.
Marcuse asserted that, "Art is powerless against this reconcilia-
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tion with the irreconcilable; it is inherent in the aesthetic form
itself ....Thus even the prison scene in Eaust is beautiful, as is the
lucid madness in Buchner's Lenz, Therese's story of the death of her
mother in Kafka's Amerika and Beckett's Endgame."15
Despite this self-limitation, Marcuse held that the idea of Beauty
remains subversive of the existing order and offers the most powerful
alternative to this order. Art is carmitted to Eros in its fight
against social and instinctual repression. According to Marcuse, "Art
represents the ultimate goal of all revolutions: the freedom and hap
piness of the individual. m1^
Marcuse maintained that the commitment to aesthetic form guaran
tees the autonomy of art vis a vis social reality. While social con
ditions are always present in the work of art, even if only as back
ground or horizon, the work must transcend the given social relations
in its creation of a fictitious world.
Marcuse rejected attempts to abandon aesthetic form in favor of a
direct depiction of reality because in such depictions art loses its
critical distance from its subject. "Renunciation of the aesthetic
form does not cancel the difference between art and life— but it does
cancel that between essence and appearance, in which the truth of art
has its home and which determines the political value of art."15
The collapse of essence into appearance would represent the end of
art and tie end of critical theory. Marcuse held that such phenomena
as the 'living theater’, 'cinema verite' or the artistic composition
of the soup can amounted to 'anti-art'. By abandoning aesthetic form,
such works become "the bits and pieces of the very society..." they
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seek to criticize.^ Despite the self-limitation of the aesthetic
form, Marcuse maintained that only in the idea of Beauty is preserved
the possibility of happiness and liberation.
The relationship between aesthetic form and revolution was some
what ambiguous in Marcuse's critical theory. He rejected the identifi
cation of aesthetic form with political tendency as proposed by anoth
er member of the Frankfurt Institute, Walter Benjamin. Instead, he
sided with Theodor Adorno in his debate with Benjamin over the import
ance of autonomous works of art. Because he believed that authentic
r

art was the determinate negation of existing society, Marcuse held
that authentic works must not uphold any particular social group or
political party as the revolutionary vanguard.
Marcuse argued that although art cannot change the world, "it can
contribute to changing the consciousness and drives of the men and wo
men who could change the world."1? At present, these men and women
belong to no particular social class, but rather constitute those in
dividuals for wham revolution has become a vital need.
This emphasis on needs and saisibilities resulted from Marcuse's
conviction that the proletariat no longer represented the determinate
negation of society. In an atteirpt to identify the possible catalysts
of revolutionary change, he turned his attention to various outgroups
such as students, women, the poor and third world minorities. In the
end, however, he concluded that the subject to which authentic art
might appeal "is socially anonymous; it does not coincide with the
potential subject of revolutionary practice.
Marcuse insisted that what is needed is a new system of aesthetic
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and intellectual needs which are free from the repressive power of the
performance principle. If social revolution is to take place, he held
that it will be necessary to first change the consciousnesses and
drives of the men and women who could change the world. According to
Marcuse, such a change in consciousness is possible only because the
unreality of the work of art permits it to freely contradict the unfree reality of existing society.
For Marcuse, the power of art to transcend reality makes the con
flict between art and social practice inevitable. If absolute freedcm
and justice is impossible within society, then authentic art must al
ways criticize social practice. He argued that "the 'end of art1 is
conceivable only if men are no longer capable of distinguishing be
tween true and false, good and evil, beautiful and ugly, present and
f u t u r e . S u c h a prospect would not represent a state of freedom,
but a state of barbarism.
The inherent limits to social freedom are plainly stated in The
aesthetic Dimension. "The institutions of a socialist society, even in
their most democratic form, could never resolve all the conflicts be
tween the universal and the particular, between human beings and na
ture, between individual and individual. It is the struggle for the
impossible, against the inoonquerable whose domain can perhaps never
theless be reduced."20 This profoundly anti-utopian conclusion
stands in stark contrast to the optimistic prospects outlined in Eros
and Civilization.
Despite the profound change in outlook, there is a common theme
which unites these works. In both works, the role of memory is central
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to the artistic mimesis which, in turn, directly affects the possibil
ity of happiness. In The Aesthetic Dimension, Marcuse observed that,
"Art cannot show the present without showing it as past....The mimesis
translates reality into memory. In this remembrance, art has recog
nized what is and what could be, within and beyond the social condi
tions."
In Eros and Civilization, he contended that, "The lost paradises
are the only true ones not because, in retrospect, the past joy seems
mare beautiful than it really was, but because remembrance alone pro
vides the joy without anxiety over its passing and thus gives it an
otherwise impossible duration. Time loses its power when remembrance
redeems the past. "22
The anxiety over the passing of joy goes to the heart of the
question of human happiness. If joy must pass with time, then lasting
happiness is impossible. But if the delight of the past moment can be
relived again and again in memory or in the work of art, at least same
measure of happiness may be secured. Only the reality of death as the
destruction of memory brings to an end the premise of lasting gratifi
cation.
Marcuse's response to the inevitability of death was surprising.
111 Etcs and Civilization, he remarked that, "The necessity of death
does not refute the possibility of final liberation. Like the other
possibilities, it can be made rational— painless. Men can die without
anxiety if they know that what they love is protected from misery and
oblivion." 23
It appears as if Marcuse had not fully reconciled himself to the
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finality of death in this passage. His prescription for a painless
death seems out of place with the fact that it is impossible to com
pletely protect what one loves from misery and oblivion— particularly
from beyond the grave.
In The Aesthetic Dimension, however, the tone is decidedly more
pessimistic. Even the power of remembrance to redeem the past seems
almost illusory. Marcuse wrote that, "While art bears witness to the
necessity of liberation, it also testifies to its limits. What has
been done cannot be undone; what has passed cannot be recaptured. His
tory is guilt but not redemption. Eros and Thanatos are lovers as well
as adversaries... .The world was not made for the sake of the human
being and it has not become more human. "24
He further pointed out that it is difficult to imagine any society
which could abolish what is called fate or chance. He maintained that
art "bears witness to the truth of dialectical materialism— the per
manent non-identity between subject and object, individual and indi
vidual. "25 Consequently, even the rational society projected by
critical theory could not guarantee the general happiness which
Marcuse sought.
Finally, he asserted that death represents "a constant hazard,
misfortune, a constant threat even in moments of happiness, triumph,
fulfillment....death retains the negation inherent in society, in
history. "26
Despite the gloominess which these conclusions reveal, Marcuse did
not abandon his inquiry into the possibility of human happiness. While
he acknowledged that "tragedy is always and everywhere...", he also
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maintained that "this insight, inexorably expressed in art, may well
shatter faith in progress but it may also keep alive another image and
another goal of praxis, namely the reconstruction of society and na
ture under the principle of increasing the human potential for hap
piness. The revolution is for the sake of life, not death. "27
Marcuse maintained that happiness involves knowledge, that it is
the prerogative of the animal rationale. Happiness is not to be found
in the mere feeling of satisfaction, however, but in the reality of
freedom and satisfaction. Although death represents a final barrier to
lasting happiness, Marcuse did not abandon revolution and the pursuit
of social justice as the means to increase the potential for human
happiness. In The Aesthetic Dimension he concluded that, "If the re
membrance of things past would beocme a motive power in the struggle
for changing the world, the struggle would be waged for a revolution
hitherto suppressed in the previous historical revolutions."28
What this revolution would be like and what type of society it
might produce remains to be seen. For Marcuse, the power of reason and
memory to comprehend and project a better world provided the basis for
his critical theory of society. It is our endowment as rational and
sensuous beings which makes it possible far us to transcend our pre
sent conditions by appreciating our past. As Marx observed, the philo
sophers have interpreted the world, in various ways, the goal is still
to change it.

TIME AND HAPPINESS

While happiness has been acknowledged by philosophers to represent
an end in itself, the means to that end vary radically. The social
conditions which Marcuse charted as necessary pre-conditions for the
possibility of happiness— an order of abundance, democratic planning
and social justice— remain the task of political praxis. At the same
time, he also recognized that death and human imperfection presented
ultimate barriers to lasting happiness.
Plato understood that men do not only want to possess good things,
but that they want to possess them forever. The impossibility of
satisfying this desire, however, led to the birth of theory as the
attempt to understand the world in order to overcome suffering and
death.
The Western response to suffering and the necessity of death has
been diverse. The religious tradition has tended to deny the reality
of death by offering the promise of eternal life. The secular tra
dition, in the extreme, has emphasized material satisfaction because
of the inevitability of death. Unfortunately, the pursuit of earthly
riches within a context of scarcity has led to domination and ex
ploitation. Slavery and servitude, discrimination, poverty and in
justice are mare than the results of natural necessity. They are also
the products of the spirit of capitalism, which in its pursuit of
worldly gain has subjected the less fortunate to worldly misery.
There is, however, another path to human happiness. Marcuse's
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critical theory adopted the insights of hedonism and eudaemonism,
Marxian political economy and Freudian metapsychology in order to
establish the necessary preconditions for the realization of a general
happiness. His enphasis on material abundance, social justice and
instinctual liberation provides a theoretical basis for the creation
of a rational society. The possibility of lasting happiness, however,
remains problematic.
Marcuse maintained that happiness requires knowledge. If, however,
knowledge of the truth of existence is tragic, how can happiness be
secured? In response to this dilemma, Schiller introduced the concept
of the play impulse as a means of abolishing time in tine. Likewise,
Nietzsche's myth of the eternal return sought to break the domination
of time over life. The poetic and the mystical conceptions of life
have proclaimed the momentary identity of subject and object as the
ultimate truth of existence. Bourgeois art also offered the momentary
happiness of the beautiful illusion which could be experienced again
and again.
The question of happiness appears to be inseparable from the
question of time. Anxiety over the passage of time robs us of the
possibility of happiness. Pear and anxiety emerge in relation to a
future possibility which threatens to destroy what we love. Want, as
the consciousness of deprivation, relates the unsatisfactory present
to a possibly better future. Freedom from fear, anxiety and want not
only would require social justice and an order of abundance, but also
would require the abolition of time in time— an accomplishment which
no society can Insure.
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Obviously, the question of happiness must not be reduced to one of
the transcendence of consciousness. Freedom for the fullest possible
development of human capabilities and sensibilities requires that we
attend to the pursuit of human solidarity and a just social order.
The spiritual and the materialist conceptions of life must somehow
be reconciled. While religious conceptions may be unscientific, what
science can explain the origin of life? The mystery of life may ulti
mately invalidate the certainty of all science and philosophy.
While the poetic experience of time may not resolve the question
of happiness, it does speak to the central issues at stake. In his
poem, "Song of Myself," Walt Whitman reflected on his belief in the
cycles of life and death which affirm rather than negate the possi
bility of lasting happiness.
The clock indicates the moment— but what does eternity indicate?
We have thus far exhausted trillions of winters and summers,
There are trillions ahead, and trillions ahead of them.
Births have brought us richness and variety.
And other births will bring us richness and variety....
And I say to mankind, Be not curious about God,
For I who am curious about each am not curious about God,
(No array of terms can say how much I am at peace about God
and about death.)
I hear and behold God in every object, yet understand God not
in the least,....
And as to you Death, and you bitter hug of mortality, it is idle
to try to alarm me....
And as to you Life I reckon you are the leavings of many deaths,
(No doubt I have died myself ten thousand times before.)...
There is that in me— I do not know what it is— but I know it is
in me....
It is not chaos or death— it is form, union, plan— it is eternal
life— it is Happiness.1
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While the truth of poetic expression is at most suggestive, we
have seen that Marcuse maintained that there is an intimate connection
between the truth of art and the possibility of happiness. He also
spoke of aesthetic sensibility as rational and moral. His conception
of reason and morality, however, was linked to human sensuousness as a
practical concern. Consequently, the creation of aesthetic sensibility
and the pursuit of social justice became comnon goals of his critical
theory.
For Marcuse, critical rationality is completely carmitted to the
realization of a society in which human beings could freely satisfy
their needs in accordance with their reason. His critique of techno
logical rationality did not reject technology, but the mentality which
comprehends the end of life only in terms of technical efficiency. He
opposed the rational organization of modem society precisely on the
basis of its efficiency.
What is to be done? The truth of art is also the truth of critical
reason— to call things what they are, not to imitate but to comprehend
life. The task of political praxis has not changed since Marx— it is
still our task to change the world. In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse
outlined the criteria which he believed must be invoked to justify any
call far a new social order.
"(1) The transcendent project must be in accordance with the
real possibilities open at the attained level of the material
and intellectual culture.
(2) The transcendent project, in order to falsify the estab
lished totality, must demonstrate its own higher rationality in
the threefold sense that
(a) it offers the prospect of preserving and improving
the productive achievements of civilization;
(b) it defines the established totality in its very
structure, basic tendencies, and relations;

72

(c) its realization offers a greater chance for the
pacification of existence, within the framework
of institutions which offer a greater chance for
the free development of human needs and faculties."2
In the face of a political system dominated by a military techno
cracy which threatens the very survival of humanity, the possibility
of human happiness depends upon the success of political praxis. What
is needed is the courage and organization to bring about those re
forms which will reduce the international tensions and in justices
which have brought us to the brink of annihilation.
Human survival is the first priority. Only a human species can re
produce the social order necessary for individual happiness. Survival
requires the end of the nuclear arms race and a general reduction in
armaments and violence throughout the world. It may also require the
abolition of the nation-state as the predominant form of political
organization. In its place, a new international order must be estab
lished which can administer justice without recourse to warfare.
Survival also requires the abolition of hunger, disease and all
farms of want and privation. Only an order of abundance is consistent
with freedom. The conquest of scarcity remains the great unfinished
project of mankind, the completion of which is greatly hindered by the
presence of political elites and authoritarian regimes. A conversion
of economic resources now cormitted to warfare, however, would go far
in the effort to provide for the general welfare.
Survival means the protection and enhancement of the natural world
as the environment in which we live. The physical and psychological
health of human beings is directly related to the preservation of
nature. The beauty and grandeur of open spaces is a source of human
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creativity which, if lost, would destroy the possibility of happiness.
Finally, survival means solidarity with all members of the human
species. Errpathy for the plight of others can help to alleviate the
unnatural misery which social domination new enforces. Human solidar
ity may also reconcile men and women to the fact that the suffering
which cannot be alleviated may at least be endured.
The transcendent project which Marcuse envisioned would also
entail a new science and a new technology. While the scientific
enterprise would not necessarily change, the direction and application
of scientific research would create new facts and new possibilties.
Technology as the tools and methods to feed the hungry is an essen
tially different project than the technology utilized to build a
space-based weapons system. A rational use of technology must respond
to a human reason which pursues human goals rather than technical
efficiency or profit maximization.
The powers which restrict and deform humanity are also human
powers which can, therefore, be confronted and transformed. The re
strictions inposed by natural necessity, on the other hand, can be
reduced, but never eliminated.
Might not human beings one day achieve iimiortality through techni
cal means? Even if the human lifespan could be extended indefinitely,
the lack of human perfection would, of itself, guarantee sorrow. Per
fection, on the other hand, would halt the passage of time. It would
capture in a moment the identity of subject and object, the unity of
self and world as the source of life and as the guarantee of lasting
happiness.
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Marcuse's preoccupation with human happiness represents a peren
nial concern of philosophy. The original impulse of philosophy was to
ward the 'other world' as the hope for a happiness which society and
material existence denied. What the two-world theory failed to acknow
ledge, however, was the fact that the other world cannot exist apart
from this world. The otherreality exists within this reality, even if
it is accessible only in memory or

in the beautiful illusion of the

aesthetic dimension.
If happiness exists only in the moment, then it would be incorrect
to assert that even the most rational society could insure a general
happiness. Par every society is subject to time and time is the nega
tion of happiness. No momentary satisfaction may cancel the future or
the inevitable path to death.
Although social change cannot insure human happiness, neither can
it be ignored. The attempt to transcend reality through art will ulti
mately fail because aesthetic transcendence is illusory. While the
aesthetic experience can become a factor in the struggle for greater
freedom, justice and solidarity, it cannot replace the need for poli
tical praxis.
In the end, there is no other world than the one which is shared
by all of humanity. How we live now is of critical importance in de
termining how we will live and die

in the future. The commitment to

the future can only be expressed in the here and now— in what we say
and in what we do.
The spiritual and the materialist paths to happiness converge on
the same road when we see that the realm of matter and the realm of
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spirit cannot be separated. There is no consciousness which is not
embodied.
From Plato's Eros as the love of perfection and iirmortality to
Marcuse's Eros as the free expression of human instincts, philosophy
has moved from the idea of happiness to the search for its realization
in society. Although Marcuse's transcendent project may be premature,
given the attained level of consciousness and social organization, it
nevertheless articulates the perennial protest against the subjugation
of human desires to the interests of social domination. His critical
theory may have come a hundred years too soon, or a thousand. We can
only hope that his vision of social harmony and instinctual gratifica
tion did not ccme too late to reverse the fatal dialectic of civiliza
tion.
Herbert Marcuse's final vision of existence was profoundly antiutopian. His analysis of the possibilities and the limitations to
human happiness, however, makes it possible to continue his critical
theory in light of the actual tendencies toward liberation existent
within this culture. Such efforts would represent the ongoing caimitment of philosophy to happiness and would provide the basis for the
further development of a critical theory of society.
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